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Abstract: 
Both camps made extensive use of social media during the referendum, both to 
mobilise existing supporters and to convert new ones. However, the three main 
groups – Stronger In, Vote Leave and Leave.EU – each took differing strategies 
within this. Drawing on tweets published by the groups, the paper compares the 
use of different positive and negative frames, as well the thematic content. While 
reinforcing other work that shows differentials in focus on specific themes – 
economics for Stronger In, politics and immigration for the Leave groups – the 
analysis also highlights the use on both sides of “sticks” (capitalisation on the 
other side’s errors) and “stones” (new issues and framings that the group brings to 
the debate). If the latter constituted the pre-game plan, then the former became a 
substantial part of the practical application during the campaign, a development 
reinforced by the nature of the medium itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 referendum on British membership of the European Union (EU) had a substantial 
element of social media activity. This was due not only to the increased pervasiveness of such 
platforms in social and political interaction, but also to the particular nature of the European 
debate in the UK: for the past two decades, eurosceptics have found, and made much use, of 
online spaces to build contacts and community, as well as to refine lines of argument. The 
relatively unexpected opportunity to make use of this digital space presents an important and 
interesting element in our understanding of the referendum’s conduct and outcome. 
 
To this is coupled the comparative novelty of the referendum itself. While there have been 
increasing numbers of votes on EU-related topics across the Union in the post-Maastricht 
period, this is only the second to deal explicitly with the question of membership, the first 
being the UK’s 1975 vote: thus there is a question-mark over whether the dynamics of such 
votes apply in this current case (see Qvortrup 2016). Moreover, while there has been a 
progressive increase in the use of referendums in the British political system since the late 
1990s (Reidy & Suiter 2015), the EU vote is only the third national instance and the first 
since 1975 to involve a relatively high level of engagement by political actors. As a result, 
both the format and the content are relatively novel, allowing for the potential emergence of 
unusual forms of campaigning. 
 
This paper considers the basic question of how and why the campaigns on the two sides 
differed in their content and framing. We understand a frame as the emphasis of one 
particular aspect of a topic over another, providing a means to understand an issue through 
the way it is constructed and the mobilisation of certain values (Semetko and Vreese 2004: 
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92). As political activists around the world endeavour to make the most of this new digital 
space, the lessons to be learnt from the EU referendum have wide interest. Similarly, the 
increasing use of referendums as devices for taking major public policy decisions creates a 
very different space, as compared to elections: the choice is typically binary and the 
composition and arrangement of political voices does not necessarily map onto political 
parties. Thus the EU referendum allows us to reflect on whether more historical assumptions 
about behaviour in referendums still holds true in the digital age: do new social media 
reinforce or subvert the logics of campaigning that existed beforehand? 
 
To answer this, the paper analyses the Twitter campaigns of the two official referendum 
campaign groups – Vote Leave and Britain Stronger In Europe (‘Stronger In’) – as well as the 
other notable online campaigning group, Leave.EU, drawing on a dataset covering the six 
months prior to the date of the vote, the 23
rd
 June 2016. After establishing some hypotheses 
on the basis of other referendums, the paper analyses the three groups’ output across a variety 
of factors, including content, frame and engagement with audiences, before concluding with 
some observations on the particularities and wider lessons of the EU referendum. 
 
 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA AND REFERENDUMS 
Twitter has become one of the most popular social media sites in the political arena (Vergeer, 
Hermans, and Sams 2013: 479) and ranks as the eleventh most popular website in the UK and 
third most popular social media platform, after Facebook (first) and YouTube (second), as 
measured by the user-base (SimilarWeb 2016). The campaigns’ use of social media, and 
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Twitter in particular, in the run up to the EU Referendum warrants examination. The success 
of Twitter as a social media platform can in part be attributed to the way it models key 
aspects of human relationships, notably the asymmetry of dyadic bonds, setting it apart from 
other social networks (Porter 2009). Although Facebook has adapted its platform to emulate 
this ‘human centric’ approach it nonetheless remains somewhat of a one-way broadcast 
medium during political campaigns (Larsson 2016; Williamson et al. 2010). This is reflected 
in politicians’ different perceptions of the two platforms, with Twitter perceived as attracting 
‘political junkies’ and Facebook a more diverse community (Ross and Burger 2014: 204): 
One marker of this is the extent to which Twitter has become a key part of ‘old media’ 
journalists’ activities, providing a gateway for setting news agendas and frame (Parmelee 
2013). The open nature of Twitter leads to the ‘asymmetric’ modelling of human 
relationships, a user can ‘follow’ another user without reciprocation (Porter 2009). Moreover, 
by looking at official accounts, it is possible to establish a benchmark of authorship between 
political actors, which has become more complex in a multi-media environment (e.g. 
Overdorf & Greenstadt 2016). This has the potential to make Twitter an excellent platform 
for political interaction (Grant et al. 2010: 580). 
 
Role and purpose of social media for political campaigning 
The other issue to examine is the value of social media for political campaigning or, perhaps 
more pertinently, its perceived value. There is a growing body of literature on the use of 
Twitter in the political arena and for political campaigning specifically, however, it is 
fragmented among the disciplines of political science, computer science and communication 
studies (Jungherr 2014). In addition, most existing studies on Twitter and politics are data 
centred, focusing on the description of empirics, with only a minority seeking to situate their 
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research within wider theoretical debates (Jungherr 2014: 4). This paper seeks to provide not 
only a novel dataset, but also contextualisation within a specific political milieu. In doing so, 
it contributes to the existing literature on social media and politics which has addressed the 
use of social media by politicians seeking (re)election (Graham et al. 2013; Vergeer and 
Hermans 2013), by political parties (Baxter and Marcella 2012) and in referendums (Baxter 
and Marcella 2013). 
 
At first glance, social media appears to provide an opportunity to move to a more interactive 
form of campaigning and away from the mere transmission of a message to engagement with 
followers. However, so far this has not proved to be the case, for example, in respect of the 
use of the platform by political parties in elections campaigns.(Graham et al, 
2013).Moreover, in the run up to the Scottish parliamentary elections in 2011 not only was 
there little two-way engagement or dialogue on social media but the accounts frequently 
lacked any real policy comment (Baxter and Marcella 2013).  The majority of the tweets by 
candidates, or just over a third (31.6%), were in ‘primary broadcast’ mode, where the 
accounts provided their own personal views on a range of issues or were related to campaign 
activities (11.3%). This supports the broader finding that outside of campaign periods 
politicians have also not used social media to interact with ‘normal’ Twitter users (Kim and 
Park 2012). The value of social media for ‘converting’ voters is therefore questionable. 
 
The value of social media, and Twitter specifically, for political campaigning is not as a 
‘conversion tool’ but rather as part of a broader promotional strategy. For example, during the 
2010 UK general election, Scottish candidates  dedicated a significant proportion of their 
tweets (15%) to campaign related activities or promotion (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 115). 
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This was even more striking for the official party Twitter accounts, with over a quarter 
focused on campaign activities (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 118). Across the parties 
candidates were keen to use Twitter to present a good impression of themselves, for example, 
by highlighting the volume of emails they received and in this respect the online campaign 
mirrored the impression management seen offline  (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 116). They 
also found only a small percentage (6.3%) of tweets dedicated to interacting with followers, 
and an even smaller amount responding to personal attacks on the candidate (1.4%) or the 
party (0.7%) (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 116). Both of these factors indicate an attempt to 
remove the campaign from the personal level. They found that candidates were keen to make 
themselves look busy and engaged in supporting their potential constituents, for example, by 
highlighting the number of emails they received, even in reality this is not what they were 
doing (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 116). This finding is supported in the  2010 UK general 
election campaign, where candidates primarily used Twitter as a broadcast medium (68% of 
content), either through their own tweets, retweets or retweets with comments (Graham et al. 
2016: 774). It is therefore evident that Twitter has served as a public relations tool for 
candidates rather than primarily as a means to enhance democratic processes. Thus far the use 
of Twitter by various actors during political campaigns has left unrealised its potential as an 
interactive platform, the lack of engagement by candidates and parties. This leads to a first 
hypothesis:  
All groups will use Twitter more to mobilise existing supporters, rather than to 
convert new ones (H1). 
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Social media use by political ‘outsiders’ 
Social media offers smaller parties a considerably more level playing field in comparison to 
the use of website campaigning (Southern 2014: 13; Gibson and McAllister 2015: 530). The 
use of social media has also been found to differ across the political spectrum and by party 
type. For instance, a study by Vergeer et al. (2013: 488) of the European elections, found that 
smaller and younger parties, those which might benefit from Twitter the most, utilised it the 
least. The study also identified that parties situated towards the centre of the political 
spectrum used Twitter much more extensively than those on the right who were least likely to 
utilise the platform. In the UK context, UKIP and British National Party (BNP) candidates 
have been the slowest to set up Twitter accounts, with Labour and Liberal Democrat 
candidates being early adopters, while Green party candidates engaged more with Twitter 
than Conservatives (Southern 2014: 13). The comparative disengagement of UKIP candidates 
with Twitter could be explained by the composition and structure of the parties. UKIP, for 
example, has a comparatively top-down party structure (Abedi & Lungberg 2009). There is 
also variation among politicians who do use Twitter along party lines in terms of their 
engagement with the platform, with Labour the most interactive and the Conservatives the 
least (Graham et al. 2016: 774). The results of Graham et al’s (2016) study support previous 
findings but are limited by the fact that only the three main parties Conservatives, Labour and 
Liberal Democrats were included in the sample. 
 
Aside from the particularities of UKIP candidates’ Twitter presence, the party’s presence as a 
populist right-wing party, rather than part of the establishment, can account for its use of 
Twitter. Twitter provides significant benefits for parties such as UKIP, allowing them to 
broadcast their message and bypass the traditional media which they see as distorting their 
“This is an accepted manuscript of an article published by SAGE in The British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, available online at: 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1369148117700659   It is not the copy of record. 
Copyright © 2017 SAGE.” 
 
8 
 
aims (Gibson and McAllister 2015: 531). And while relatively few users follow politicians or 
political parties on Twitter directly, tweets can also influence more widely consumed media 
coverage (Larsson and Moe 2012). It therefore offers an opportunity for influence 
incommensurate with status. For example, there are communities of eurosceptics on Twitter, 
which UKIP have actively sought to engage with, such as the #NO2EU community and 
indicating that the party has experience of cultivating social media to supports its own 
message (O’Callaghan et al. 2013: 100). This community also  engages actively with British 
current affairs programmes including BBC Question Time (#BBCQT) and BBC Newsnight 
(#newsnight) (O’Callaghan et al. 2013: 100). Television debates have previously been 
identified as driving a significant increase in traffic on Twitter and by political candidates 
during election periods (Baxter and Marcella 2012: 118; Graham et al. 2016: 773). 
 
Referendum campaigns in perspective: frames, tropes and personalisation 
In comparative perspective it is evident that certain patterns emerge in referendum campaigns 
across temporalities . Two points are of particular relevance here, first, it is the campaign that 
captures the centre ground through successfully appealing to the median voter which is likely 
to win. Second, and relatedly, citizens are likely to decide on the basis of cues (for example, 
‘who’s behind it’) rather than on analysis of the issues, meaning that voters apply heuristics 
in coming to their decision. As a result, groups challenging the status quo have an incentive 
to use more negative and emotional claims, to counterbalance the factual existence of that 
status quo (e.g. Garry 2013, Bolsen et al 2014). Atikcan persuasively argues that there has 
been a series of successful re-framings of referendum campaigns across the EU by those 
challenging the status quo, through use of “negative, concrete and immediate” themes (2015: 
8). The 2011 Alternative Vote (AV) referendum is a case in point and resonates with the EU 
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Referendum campaign. In 2011, the ‘no’ campaign invented (by their later admission) a 
claim that the introduction of AV would cost over £250 million, while the ‘yes’ side 
compared the Conservative Chairman Baroness Sayeeda Warsi to Dr Josef Goebbels, despite 
also calling for a ‘mature debate’ (Qvortrup 2012: 111). The parallels to the EU Referendum 
are obvious where the tone of the debate was criticised, particularly after the murder of MP 
Jo Cox with (largely unrealised) calls for introspection on what London Mayor, Sadiq Khan 
called the ‘climate of hatred, of poison, of negativity, of cynicism’ generated by the 
campaigns (Guardian 17 June 2016). Both campaigns also engaged in a high level of 
personal attacks. The most striking similarity is the Leave campaign’s assertion that leaving 
the EU would provide an additional £350 million a week for the NHS, a claim discredited 
and quickly removed from Vote Leave’s website after the result (Independent 27 June 2016). 
This claim contributed to the elevation of the NHS as a key campaign issue, despite the very 
limited role of the EU in public health policy (Hervey 2016). This suggests a second 
hypothesis: 
Leave groups will be more negative in their framing (H2) 
 
The third hypothesis is that the Leave groups will make more use of emotional language and 
frames (H3). This is suggested by wider findings that the discourse of the EU Referendum 
was shaped on both sides by campaigners using messages intended to engage the electorate 
on an emotional level. This saw the benefits of European unity and consequences of Brexit 
put up against sovereignty issues and patriotism, with a strand of xenophobia (Farrell 2016). 
This effectiveness of the latter was reinforced by the coining of several key slogans - most 
notably ‘take back control’ - which served to shape the debate. Affect also had a role in 
previous referendum campaigns, with the 2014 Scottish independence referendum a case in 
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point, with David Cameron making reference to his heartbreak ‘if this family of nations was 
torn apart’ (Reuters 10 September 2014).  
 
The EU Referendum debate was deeply personalised, with Prime Minster David Cameron 
speaking for Remain and former Mayor of London Boris Johnson most prominent on the 
Leave side. The centrality of two Conservatives to the debate coupled with the (self-)side-
lining of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour (Higgins 2016, Shipman 2016) and contributed to the 
framing of the arguments as pro/anti-establishment. This left Remain with the task of 
defending a status quo which many felt distanced from (Martin 2016) and which weakened 
the capacity to deliver effective cues (Marsh 2015). Thus in the battle for the centre ground it 
was Leave that framed its campaign primarily as an emotional appeal to ‘take back control’, 
while Remain chose to deploy a more utilitarian, cost-benefit approach. 
 
Our final two hypotheses build on and bring together the literature discussed here, on the 
conduct of referendum campaigns and the use of social media by political actors. We do this 
through the use of two concepts ‘sticks’ and ‘stones’. Sticks are mistakes made by the other 
side, which are then used to question that side’s competence and credibility. This concept 
builds on the literature on negative campaigning and emotive language. In contrast stones are 
identified as the use of core arguments – both substantive and emotional – in an attempt to 
anchor debate and set agendas. In order to examine the use of these two concepts in the EU 
referendum campaigns on social media we identify the following hypotheses: 
Leave groups will make more use of ‘sticks’ than Remain (H4) 
Remain groups will make more use of ‘stones’ than Leave (H5). 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA SET 
Data is drawn from the primary official Twitter accounts of the three main groups in the EU 
referendum: Stronger In, Vote Leave and Leave.EU. In contrast to other social media 
platforms, including Facebook, Twitter allows far more comprehensive access to its data 
through the Twitter application programming interface (API). This makes the quantity and 
quality of the extractable data better suited to meaningful analysis. Tweet content and 
metadata were extracted directly from Twitter using our own Python script as this was 
deemed preferable to using a third party software in terms of transparency and replicability, 
with our code hosted on the GitHub site and available for others to use 
(https://github.com/23KAM). 
 
The Python script was run weekly, collecting tweets for the previous seven days, between 
11
th
 February and 22
nd
 June 2016. Data collected included the tweet text, timestamps of the 
tweet, number of retweets and favourites at the time of collection, and number of followers at 
that point in time. While this means that those tweets produced closer to the weekly 
collection time (midnight on Wednesday) will have slightly lower retweet and favourite 
figures than the rest, this is a minimal effect, as volumes were very low at this time, and it is 
clear that the very large majority of such interactions happen within an hour of production 
(Sysomos 2010). Since data was consistently collected on Thursday mornings, this means 
there was no discernible effect on the retweet data reported below. 
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More consequentially, the methodology used only captures Tweets still on the accounts at the 
time of collection, so does not get any tweets that have been deleted before the script was run. 
We are only aware of one instance where this was an issue: Leave.EU’s ‘Orlando’ tweet 
linked shootings in Florida with EU free movement on 13 June (BBC 13/6/16). This received 
much criticism at the time and was quickly removed, although similar messages were posted 
in the following days. Thus, while we do not have a totally complete collection of all Twitter 
output during the survey period, we do have all of the output that the relevant group saw fit to 
stand by, and thus we take it as a reliable gauge of the group’s intent and messaging. 
 
The analysis here covers three groups that took part in the EU referendum campaign, while 
the Electoral Commission lists 122 individuals and groups that registered their participation 
(Electoral Commission 2016). The restricted coverage is based on a two-fold logic. Firstly, 
the officially designated groups occupy a legally and politically distinct status, under the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA 2000), with access to larger 
financial resources and spending limits, privileged access for their own broadcasts and to 
media coverage, plus an umbrella position that integrates the main elements within each 
side’s campaign. On the Remain side, it was long clear that Stronger In would be the vehicle 
for bringing together campaigners, not least as it placed that responsibility at arm’s length 
from the government. 
 
For Leave, matters were complicated by the early emergence of two main contenders for the 
designation. While Vote Leave was ultimately successful in this in April, by that time 
Leave.EU had established an extensive network of campaigners and activity, making good 
use of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) party rolls, to which it had access. Leave.EU thus 
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represents the only mass-membership organisation on either side of the debate, as evidenced 
by the size of its social media footprint. Together, these three groups make up the key actors 
among those groups established for the purpose of fighting the referendum – although 
Leave.EU has subsequently moved to build a more permanent structure – and were the only 
three with a broad-based approach to the campaign. Table 1 summarises the evolution of 
Twitter followers for the groups across the survey period: by way of comparison, these 
volumes were consistently one order of magnitude smaller than the number of Facebook 
followers. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The total dataset comprises approximately 18,000 tweets, sharing equally among the three 
groups (Stronger In, n = 6,076; Vote Leave, n = 5,818, Leave.EU, n = 6,395). As Figure 1 
shows, the two official groups followed a very similar pattern on weekly volumes, with a 
very marked rise in the final three weeks of campaigning: Leave.EU maintained a much more 
steady volume throughout the survey period. Note that the final week’s data includes the 36 
hours when none of the groups produced any content, after the murder of Jo Cox MP, as part 
of the broader suspension of campaigning. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Coding of tweets was done manually, to record theme and framing, in addition to 
supplementary computer-aided (NVivo) word frequency analysis and text searches, to 
measure sentiment and for additional content analysis. The first part of our analysis had two 
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layers. First, we coded tweets according to key themes, which we identified as: business, 
benefits of EU, criticism of the EU, celebrity or public figure, domestic issues, external 
views, immigration, the other campaign, politics, public opinion, role in the world, security, 
social security and practical campaign-related. While some tweets contained more than one 
category, the primary subject of the tweet was deemed to be the tweet’s theme. These 
categories were developed using an inductive approach, driven by the research question. 
Second and drawing on Aalberg et al’s (2012) notions of strategic and game frames, we 
coded each tweet according to its positive or negative presentation of a substantive argument 
or of the group or its opponents: on the substantive arguments, ‘positive’ refers to benefits of 
the group’s preferred outcome, while ‘negative’ presents costs of not following that preferred 
outcome. This produced a four-way matrix, with tweets being assigned all relevant codes. 
The sentiment analysis was conducted using a list of positive and negative words imported 
into NVivo. We also used NVivo to conducted word frequency analysis for the groups and to 
conduct text searches for particular words. These two layers of manual and computer-aided 
analysis provide for a sophisticated understanding of the content of each tweet. 
 
Finally, measures of follower engagement were developed. While the number of followers is 
a basic proxy for this, it is also useful to note how much those followers go beyond simply 
reading the content, as this would suggest it has an increased value for those individuals and 
scope to become viral, spreading out to an ever-wider set of users and thus creating 
opportunities to inform or sway voters. Therefore, as well as absolute volume of retweets, we 
present data on the mean number of retweets per tweet per follower, which gives an index of 
the relative efficiency of each group in achieving this engagement. As Figures 2 and 3 
highlight, Vote Leave consistently out-performed Stronger In throughout the campaign on 
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absolute numbers of retweets and on our engagement index too. Leave.EU generally out-
performed Stronger In on absolutes, but not generally on the engagement index. We note here 
that in comparison with other groups tracked during the survey, engagement rates for these 
three groups were consistently among the lowest, possibly reflecting their more diverse 
audiences and the larger number of followers with only a marginal interest in the referendum. 
 
FIGURES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
The survey corpus reveals a number of patterns on the question of how much the medium is 
used to mobilise versus to convert. All three groups demonstrate a similar distribution of 
framing, with “positive mentions of own group” always being the most common and with 
approximately half of all content containing substantive arguments, with negative arguments 
always outweighing positive ones (Table 2). In addition, when looking at themes (Table 3), 
we find that ‘campaign’ - made up of tweets dealing with process issues – is by far the most 
common theme for the two Leave groups and second most common for Stronger In: when 
combined with the ‘opposing campaign’ theme – the other process-related theme – we find 
approximately one-third of all tweets are covered. 
 
This suggests that there is a substantial focus on mobilisation of existing supporters, rather 
than converting new ones: while the former can be used to engage the latter, this was only 
made explicit on rare occasions, most obviously with Stronger In’s brief #Votin hashtag in 
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May. This is reflected in the ‘campaign’ theme, where all groups would retweet local 
campaigners’ campaigning and canvassing activity, as well as in the ‘external views’, 
‘celebrity/public figure’ and ‘public opinion’ themes, all of which were presented as evidence 
of wider support for the relevant groups’ objectives. While Leave made much in general of 
questioning expertise, there is a clear divergence between the two Leave groups’ approaches 
on this latter point, with Vote Leave much less likely to invoke other voices. 
 
The mixture of positive and negative arguments also merits mention. That all three groups 
were more likely to use the latter (“don’t choose the alternative because…”) highlights to a 
considerable degree the nature of Twitter as a space of instantaneous reaction. The platform 
lends itself well to rebuttal and questioning, connecting to other media through the use of 
hashtags, but with the consequence that content is more likely to be negatively-framed (see 
Ceron & d’Abba 2015). This reached its high-point in the campaign when both Vote Leave 
and Stronger In produced very substantial volumes of content during the various TV debates 
(discussed below). 
 
TABLES 2 & 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Despite this tendency, we find that there is an overall majority of content with a positive 
frame, when looking at the survey period as a whole. However, this masks a clear trend over 
time towards less positive framing (Figure 4): While there were no evident development 
during the time before the official campaign, once this began in mid-April there was a growth 
in the volume of negatively-framed content, especially negative comments about other groups 
(Figure 5). As noted above, this ties in with the advent of the TV debates, where much more 
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content was devoted to attacking opponents than to supporting one’s own side. While this 
effect was seen in all three groups, the decline in positive framing was smallest for Stronger 
In, while Leave.EU was consistently less positive than Vote Leave, possibly because it felt 
less constrained, due to its lack of official designation (the gap between the two became 
clearer after the April decision by the Electoral Commission). However, as Figure 5 shows, 
Stronger In was more likely to make negative comments about their opponents than were 
Vote Leave, although in the final weeks there was little to differentiate all three groups: given 
that this frame reflects a strategy of ad hominem attacks, this calls into question how far 
Stronger In were able to run a campaign that concentrated on the substantive arguments for 
EU membership. Indeed, when themes are matched against the frames, there is very little 
difference across the three groups, with the exceptions that Stronger In was much more 
positive about ‘politics’ than either Leave group and (more obviously) on the ‘positive to EU’ 
and ‘criticism of EU’ themes. 
 
FIGURES 4 & 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
When we consider the relative use of emotion by groups, there is clear and consistent 
evidence that points to Stronger In as the more likely user. As noted above, the group is the 
most frequent user of negative comments about other groups, notwithstanding its high overall 
positive framing. However, then considering the presence of affective words, Stronger In is 
the most common user of overall positive affect and overall affect, but the least frequent user 
of overall negative affect. This holds true whether we consider the percentage of words that 
are affective or when controlling for the volume of tweets, which suggests that the group is 
more likely to use more than one affective word per tweet (Table 4). The difference between 
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the groups is found consistently across the survey period, when looking at weekly totals for 
affect. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, we analyse the corpus for word frequencies: Table 5 lists the 20 most common word-
stems for each group. This reinforces the similarities and differences between the three 
groups that have been noted above, especially in terms of how Twitter usage fits into a 
broader package of social media campaigning. 
 
Most obviously, all three groups make frequent references to themselves, with their username 
being the first or second most common word stem. In very large part, this comes from the re-
tweeting of other users’ content that mentions the group itself. The only two other usernames 
to make the top-20 are Stronger In’s press account and Grassroots Out!, a cross-party 
grouping set up to run public debates, with which Leave.EU had a relatively close 
relationship. A comparison of the word frequency analysis also draws attention to the 
disparities between the different campaigns’ approaches and is particularly revealing given 
the comparable number of tweets across the three campaigns. Both the official campaigns, 
Stronger In and Vote Leave, have a more consistent approach to their tweeting, with 
Leave.EU an outlier. This is demonstrated by the cumulative total of the weighted percentage 
of their 20 most frequently tweeted word-stems, with Stronger In’s most frequently occurring 
words accounting for 16.11% of their total tweets and Vote Leave’s a comparable 15.11%. In 
contrast, Leave.EU took a far less considered approach to its use of social media with these 
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word-stems accounting for only 10.97% of their total volume. This suggests less coordination 
on key messages and a more reactive use of Twitter. 
 
All groups also make much use of campaigning and mobilisation language (“voting”, 
“campaign”, “support”, etc.), substantiating the first hypothesis that priority lies on 
mobilisation rather than converting new supporters: links to fund-raising and enrolment as an 
activist were common throughout the period, as groups tried to deepen their connection with 
users. This is also evident in the extensive use of debate hashtags by Vote Leave and Stronger 
In, to tie themselves into the key points of public debate. Despite their duration of only a 
couple of hours at a time, both groups produced massive spikes in output (c. 4-5 tweets per 
minute) on each occasion, with a mixture of links through to supporting material for their 
speakers, rebuttals of opponents and re-tweets of positive messaging about their performance. 
Tellingly, Leave.EU did not engage in such behaviour at all, instead taking their own line 
through the campaign, not least to differentiate themselves from Vote Leave. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
A different cleavage appears in relation to the mention of individuals by each group. While 
Stronger In has no one in their top 20, both Leave groups contain more than one. The usage 
of Messers Gove, Farage and Johnson by their respective groups was uniformly positive and 
sought to reinforce their images as figureheads and leaders in the public debate. By contrast, 
the high volume of mentions of David Cameron was a clear instance of Leave making use of 
a ‘stick’, with the Prime Minister’s words and actions being repeatedly turned against him, 
both to call into question his competence and ability and to remind non-Tory voters that a 
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Leave vote would also hurt this government. This latter argument is further reinforced by 
Cameron’s absence from the Stronger In list and his own desire not to become the ‘face’ of 
Remain (Oliver 2016). 
 
As Table 3 demonstrates, groups also took varying approaches to policy points, when they 
did so at all. Stronger In focused on economic points, while Vote Leave devoted much more 
space to control and immigration: these reflect the perceived strengths of each side from 
polling (Curtice 2016). Leave.EU had much less on policy, with only “trading” appearing in 
their most frequent words, typically as part of content about the myriad opportunities 
awaiting the UK post-membership. This breakdown suggests again that groups were playing 
to their strengths, rather than seeking to (re-)claim issues from the other side: Stronger In’s 
greater use of policy points also reflects on their efforts to make more use of evidence-based 
arguments, as compared to Leave. 
 
However, the most striking observation of Table 5 is the extent to which Leave set the 
rhetorical framing and language. Stronger In’s most common word was “leaving”, well in 
excess of its use by either Leave group. Similarly, “Brexit” was more used by Stronger In 
than Vote Leave, if still well behind Leave.EU. By contrast, “remain” was used half as much 
as “leave” by all three groups. As much as this pattern might be understood as part of 
Remain’s broader effort to discredit and problematize Leave’s position, it does also expose 
the extent to which there was not a commensurate effort to articulate a positive vision of what 
EU membership could be. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The EU referendum was an atypical political campaign in many ways. The profound 
uncertainty over its timing and its content, coupled with the relative lack of experience of 
such structures in British political culture, all contributed to an unusual set of circumstances 
which appeared to necessitate the various actors to adapt their previous strategies and 
approaches to political campaigning. Thus, as much as they were able to draw on a stock of 
techniques and discourse, this underwent a process of adjustment and modification to the 
exigencies of the campaign. As a high-tempo, highly-adaptable and highly–responsive mode 
of campaigning, the Twitter activity of the groups offers a window into that adjustment. 
 
This is reflected in the evaluation of the hypotheses set out above. While Hypothesis 1 was 
supported - with all groups using the platform primarily for mobilisation and organisation of 
a pre-existing base – all of the other hypotheses present a more mixed picture. All sides made 
roughly equal use of negative frames and content (H2), suggesting that Stronger In’s use of 
‘Project Fear’ was being pursued forcefully, drawing on its success in the 2014 Scottish 
referendum. Indeed, Stronger In was also the most likely to use emotional language and 
framing, in contradiction to expectations (H3), just as it made as much use of ‘sticks’ as its 
Leave opponents (H4). Most consequentially, it was the Leave groups that appeared to make 
most use of agenda-setting ‘stones’, shaping the debate (H5). 
 
These findings reflect those found by others (e.g. Crines 2016, Parker 2016), with Leave 
making much better use of the opportunities afforded by the structure of the referendum 
debate and campaign: moreover, Leave’s choice of frames fits with Atikcan’s (2015) wider 
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findings from other referendums on EU issues. Perhaps, in this light one of the Leave side’s 
most successful moves was to discredit experts as ‘self-interested’(Parker 2016) and as such 
appealing to voters’ desire for shortcuts, rather than substantive engagement with issues. 
Leave also acted as the agenda setters, casting Remain as ‘Project Fear’ and the phrase 
‘Brexit’ became common parlance, even on the Remain side. This tactic of changing the 
debate to capture the middle ground has characterised successful referendum campaigns 
across the globe, requiring the other side to react and respond and reinforcing the centrality of 
a particular issue (Qvortrup 2012: 111-112). Twitter, with its propensity to support reactive 
commentary and to perpetuate negative arguments, proved a testing ground for the 
campaigns, with the Leave strategies ultimately translating better to this medium. 
 
In more practical terms, Leave was able to benefit from a much larger footprint in the 
Twittersphere (and online more generally), building on the medium-term work of eurosceptic 
movements in aggregating and connecting previously disparate individuals and themes into a 
broad coalition of opposition to the EU. Importantly, the existence of two large Leave groups 
– Vote Leave and Leave.EU – played to their advantage, as each was able to speak to a 
different audience, with the latter able to take a line that was not bound by the conventions of 
official designation within which the former operated. Both were able to draw on a long 
history of eurosceptic arguments and frames that had been extensively field-tested in the 
period since the Maastricht treaty, which gave them a clear head-start in establishing both the 
lines and ownership of key issues, including finance and free movement. The combination of 
two very different approaches from Vote Leave and Leave.EU proved challenging for the 
Stronger In campaign to counter and adapt to. Vote Leave’s use of Twitter demonstrated a 
much more strategic, focused and bespoke approach to their campaign, while Leave.EU drew 
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on their existing support base, with an emphasis on a high volume of tweets across the course 
of the campaign but in a more reactive, less focused way.  
 
Overall Stronger In presented a much less confident and flexible strategy, both online and off. 
Partly this was due to the need to await for the re-negotiation to conclude before government 
figures could openly join the campaign, but also it was a result of the profound lack of 
experience in articulating positive arguments about the value of EU membership. The 
evidence from the Twitter campaign suggests a more scattergun approach, trying to make a 
lot of small arguments to diverse groups, rather than taking the more concise and focused 
approach of Vote Leave and Leave.EU. This ultimately translated into a reliance on reacting 
to Leave’s initiatives and to placing much effort on discrediting Leave’s competence, 
ultimately playing into Leave’s hands with its questioning of elite authority. 
 
Beyond the referendum, the lessons from the online campaigning carry continued relevance, 
both for the UK and elsewhere. As the UK moves towards leaving the EU, the arguments and 
frames developed during the campaign continue to carry much weight, especially as they 
remain a key reference point to many voters. Leave.EU continues to operate as a pressure 
group, with its large follower base, and the scrutiny of UK-EU negotiations will continue, 
with Twitter acting as a key site for ‘hot takes’ that can have considerable impact on old 
media framing (e.g. DeLuca 2012). Stronger In has sought to do the same and has become 
Open Britain.  
 
More generically, the findings underline the adaptability of social media to new political 
spaces. In an age where populist rhetoric appears to be making considerable headway, the 
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ability to connect previously-atomised individuals and to give (at least the appearance of) 
direct access to politicians reinforces the characterisation of politics as just another arena of 
social life. Online spaces offer echo chambers that potentially reinforce divisive political 
agendas and undermine democratic logics of interaction, compromise and consensus (see 
Colleoni et al. 2014). By better understanding how political agents use social media and the 
opportunities such platforms provide, the more opportunity there will be for democracies to 
find ways to incorporate and defuse these tensions, in the service of the long-term 
maintenance of the political system. 
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TABLE 1: Twitter follower growth 
 11 February 13 April 1 June 22 June 
Stronger In 10,496 22,447 32,487 48,314 
Vote Leave 17,455 33,813 49,140 68,791 
Leave.EU 61,546 84,065 89,466 94,437 
 
 
Table 2: Groups’ tweets containing frames, Percentage 
 Stronger In Vote Leave Leave.EU 
Positive Arguments 27.34 16.07 16.48 
Negative Arguments 27.78 35.82 33.78 
Positive Mentions of 
Own Group 
33.53 39.88 38.20 
Negative mentions of 
Other Groups 
19.45 18.63 13.68 
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Table 3: Groups’ tweets by theme, Percentage 
 Stronger In Vote Leave Leave.EU 
Positive on EU 5.67 0.00 0.00 
Criticism of EU 0.00 13.56 15.96 
Politics 6.05 12.60 15.91 
Domestic 10.35 6.29 5.22 
Business/Trade 26.37 7.46 12.76 
Security 3.99 2.85 2.78 
Role in the world 3.60 0.73 1.79 
Immigration 1.20 11.18 6.55 
External Views 3.53 0.59 4.13 
Celebrity/Public 
figures 
2.70 0.40 1.08 
Public opinion 0.20 0.43 1.87 
Campaign 20.25 20.90 24.26 
Opposing campaigns 19.09 13.04 6.68 
 
 
Table 4: Groups’ use of affect 
 Stronger In Vote Leave Leave.EU 
 By tweet By words By tweet By words By tweet By words 
Negative Affect 0.36 1.99% 0.37 2.07% 0.42 2.43% 
Positive Affect 0.65 3.62% 0.55 3.04% 0.46 2.63% 
Total Affect 1.01 5.61% 0.92 5.11% 0.88 5.06% 
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Table 5: 20 most frequent word-stems, by group 
Stronger In Vote Leave Leave.EU 
Word Weighted % Word Weighted % Word Weighted % 
leaving 2.26 @voteleave 2.99 Brexit 1.51 
@strongerin 2.18 voting 1.56 @leaveeu 1.44 
Europe 1.49 #takecontrol 1.23 leaving 1.07 
voting 1.15 leaving 1.23 voting 0.78 
campaign 1.09 Gove 0.68 grassroots 0.73 
remain 0.91 campaign 0.65 #euref 0.53 
Britain 0.8 control 0.59 remain 0.46 
jobs 0.79 #itveuref 0.58 trading 0.41 
#bbcdebate 0.55 immigration 0.57 campaign 0.41 
Brexit 0.54 #bbcqt 0.56 Farage 0.38 
#itveuref 0.53 Cameron 0.55 Britain 0.37 
@strongerinpress 0.48 #Inorout 0.5 Nigel 0.37 
better 0.44 #bbcdebate 0.48 Cameron 0.36 
rights 0.44 remain 0.45 back 0.34 
economy 0.42 Brexit 0.43 people 0.33 
means 0.41 lets 0.42 Going 0.33 
today 0.41 Boris 0.42 European 0.3 
clearly 0.41 join 0.41 referendum 0.29 
busy 0.41 today 0.41 support 0.28 
trading 0.4 back 0.4 June 0.28 
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